Echoing advancements in game theory over the past few decades, political scientists have developed theoretical explanations for why wars can happen despite the enormous losses of resources they precipitate. Even if one side gains resources through war, it has been unclear from conventional international relations theories why rational actors would not peacefully settle on the transfer of resources instead of suffering the deadweight losses on both sides in actual conflict. Using formal models, the newer generation of political scientists have powerfully and intriguingly illustrated several processes of how a bargaining breaks down and war subsequently initiates between two parties competing for the same resources (e.g., land). On the other hand, theorists in related fields remain less eloquent when they address wars triggered by an alternative cause: crime. 
theoretical explanations for why wars can happen despite the enormous losses of resources they precipitate. Even if one side gains resources through war, it has been unclear from conventional international relations theories why rational actors would not peacefully settle on the transfer of resources instead of suffering the deadweight losses on both sides in actual conflict. Using formal models, the newer generation of political scientists have powerfully and intriguingly illustrated several processes of how a bargaining breaks down and war subsequently initiates between two parties competing for the same resources (e.g., land). On the other hand, theorists in related fields remain less eloquent when they address wars triggered by an alternative cause: crime. 1 For example, the following report about the Nyakyusa people in Tanzania depicts a communal war caused by a single cross-village wrongdoing:
In a case of adultery the injured husband, together with his kinsmen, pursued and attempted to kill, or torture and kill, the adulterer: self-help was not only permitted but expected in this situation, and a man's near kinsmen were obliged to assist him. Neighbours were not obliged to assist in executing vengeance, but they might be victims of it, for if the injured husband did not find the adulterer he might kill any village-mate of his enemy. Such an attack commonly led to
war between the two villages. 2 We label the former type of conflict (that is, conflict between competing parties) as "political conflict"
and the latter (conflict initiated by a crime) as "criminal conflict" although an actual conflict often lies on a continuum between these dichotomous categories. 3 Focusing on criminal conflicts, this article addresses why an individual crime (e.g., robbery, cheating, adultery, and murder) often leads to brutal conflict between tribes or ethnic groups. If a crime is one of the real causes of conflict, the suppression of crime should reduce the risk of conflict. We thus begin by reversing the question for constructive purposes:
How can crimes be deterred so that peaceful order is maintained?
Peaceful order as a public good
Once peaceful order is established in a region, it benefits everyone there; i.e., it is non-excludable. Since peaceful order entails economic externalities, it does not spontaneously emerge from free-market mechanisms. Acknowledging this property of peaceful order, a classical political philosopher maintained that it should be provided by a centralized authority that monopolizes violence and polices wrongdoers. 4 Contemporary political scientists also agreed that the provision of peaceful order is difficult without a powerful state. 5 However, more recent studies have reported that peaceful order can exist even in anarchic or weak-state societies that are far beyond the control of a government. 6 Thus, the question becomes puzzling. How can peaceful order be maintained even without a centralized regime? The theory of collective action provides some clues to this question.
Rational choice theory of collective action: accessibility and transparency
Rational choice theory logically implies that collective action is possible when all the participants expect an adequately large penalty to be placed on a deviant. For such a penalty to be credible, each member must be accessible to the rest of the group. Otherwise, a deviant cannot be penalized. In addition, the group must be capable of identifying the deviant with sufficient likelihood. Otherwise, the penalty should fall on all the suspects, or at least on some of them selected at random to deter deviance. A critical drawback in this randomized punishment is that as the population grows, the punishment becomes more annoying to everyone, and collective action becomes less beneficial for the group as a whole. Once the size of the group exceeds a pivotal capacity, collective action breaks down. 7 Thus, the problem of identifying the deviant must be solved to enforce collective action with a sizable population. To this end, the group must retain transparency among its members. To summarize, rational choice theory suggests 3 that the accurate identification and effective penalization of the deviant are key to collective action. 8 A dense social network among group members is helpful in conducting these two tasks.
Heterogeneous social networks: bonding vs. bridging social capitals
In a region where several ethnic groups coexist, the social network is not uniformly distributed; i.e., an intra-group network is presumably denser than an inter-group network. A well-known political scientist notably labeled them "bonding" and "bridging" social capitals. 9 This heterogeneity of social connectedness in an ethnically mixed society may make peaceful order difficult to establish since both accessibility and transparency among individuals, required for collective action as maintained above, are asymmetric across ethnic groups. 10 The lack of daily communication, periodic interactions, or common interests across groups may exacerbate the problem.
In addition, there may exist disagreements about the set of normative behavior among different ethnic groups. 11 (The innocent act of a Christian may be misinterpreted as an insult to neighboring Arabs and infuriate them.) A cultural gap can also destabilize an existing inter-ethnic peaceful order.
Reprisal by the collective: inter-ethnic norms and meta-norms
In many societies, once a clansman is offended by an outsider, not only do the victim and a handful of his brothers become vengeful, but also does the community as a whole, even at the risk of retaliation.
Community members who are not hurt by the offense may also take part in the punishment because of meta-norms, the willingness to punish anyone who tolerates the offender (i.e., who does not enforce a norm). In this sense, an inter-ethnic offense is a communal event even when only a few actors are directly involved. Once the number of punishers reaches a sufficient level, inter-ethnic norms become self-
policing. An illuminating episode of meta-norms is found in the old South. In 1930 Texas, a white mob angrily tried to murder a black prisoner who attacked a white woman. The mob also lynched white bystanders who refused to participate. 12 Such iron rules of meta-norms have been employed by mafias and gangs, as well as by former communist countries.
Reprisal against the collective: three possible mechanisms of criminal conflicts
Applying the theory of collective action to a multi-ethnic society, we present three hypothetical mechanisms of criminal conflicts and consider their accountabilities for peace and conflict. We employ (i) informational, (ii) preferential, and (iii) functional approaches to explain criminal conflicts.
Hypothesis (i): lack of transparency
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The heterogeneity of social connectedness in a hybrid society implies that the identity and actions of someone beyond an ethnic tie are presumably less visible than those of co-ethnics. Homophily in particular would imply that those who share ethnic ties will be geographically closer and engage in more interactions than those who do not. This transparency of intra-group interactions relative to inter-group ones characterizes such a multi-ethnic world. This means that once a crime occurs, it is relatively easy and costless to identify the criminal if he is among the victim's co-ethnics, but it is not so easy if the criminal has no relationship with the victim. If the victim and her ethnic fellows fail to identify the criminal but only find his ethnic background (possibly through his accent, language, or appearance), they cannot penalize the criminal without troubling anyone who shares similar ethnic characteristics. This indiscriminate form of vengeance, which might be a rational act to deter crimes, can spark large-scale violence. In other words, an inter-ethnic crime can cause an ethnic conflict if the identification of the criminal matters. In this kind of situation, the lack of transparency encompassing ethnic groups can spur criminal conflict. If the criminal remains anonymous, the only way to penalize him is to penalize all the suspects (ex ante), escalating into a spiral of reprisal.
This explanation of criminal conflict, however, has a potential limitation. If the identification problem plays a significant role in criminal conflicts, why are target groups of reported vengeance almost always social? Why are they not based on other observable categories such as sex, height, age, eye color, or people with glasses? This lack-of-transparency account cannot eliminate the possibility of these appearance-based conflicts, but we seldom hear of a conflict between groups divided by any of these observable categories. Such conflicts are largely non-existent. In addition, this account has another drawback: it cannot explain some conflicts which occurred even when the culprits were identified. 13 Thus, although we cannot fully reject the lack-of-transparency hypothesis, it is not a very persuasive explanation.
Hypothesis (ii): altruism among kinsmen
Economics often assumes self-interested individuals to explain a market mechanism, but the assumption of self interest is too strong if it applies to a socially closed relationship, especially among kinsmen. We do not intend to claim that altruism reduces the conflict of interest among people and helps to preserve peaceful order. This claim is trivial. 14 Instead, we consider the claim that intra-ethnic altruism can catalyze inter-ethnic conflict. To understand the role of altruism in inter-ethnic peace and conflict, recall that an effective punishment is essential to deter deviant behavior. If people are purely self-interested, a vicarious punishment, that is, the penalization of the culprit's significant others, has no deterrent effect on his culpable behavior simply because the culprit has no concern for others. Thus the vicarious punishment 5 is nonsensical for self-interested parties. In contrast, if people are altruistic toward their kin, the vicarious punishment can be more severe and preventive than the simple, direct penalization of merely the culprit himself. Aware of this effect created by altruism, avengers may threaten to target both the culprit and kin to show off the grim consequence of culpable conduct.
Note that although altruism creates incentives for group-wide feuds, it also facilitates the effective suppression of deviant behavior and thus assists in enforcing peaceful order. Altruism can work because rational avengers are not generally seeking to penalize merely for the sake of penalty but for the sake of maintaining a peaceful regime. In this sense, peace and criminal conflict are opposite sides of the same coin. 15 This form of feud was reported among a certain clan of Native Americans: "The Family to revenge this Death appointed one of their Tribe not to kill the Murderer, but his dearest Friend considering he would suffer more in the Death of the Person he loved than in dying himself." 16 This story poignantly illustrates the deterrence effect of altruism, but we have not been able to locate additional such incidents. Hence, Hypotheses (ii) may not be so empirically relevant to the emergence of criminal conflicts.
Hypothesis (iii): in-group policing
The third account focuses on the functional aspects of criminal conflicts. A critical problem in enforcing inter-ethnic peaceful order lies in the weakness of out-group networks relative to their in-group counterparts. As argued above, this weakness makes out-group monitoring and controlling difficult and therefore undermines peaceful order among several ethnic groups. The third mechanism, which we will now explore, attempts to fill in the discrepancy between in-group and out-group network densities.
The third account holds that once an inter-ethnic transgression happens, the avengers may not only retaliate against the transgressor himself but also against the transgressor's ethnic fellows as a way to urge the target group to discipline its own population. To put it another way, under the threat of such reprisal, people are motivated to monitor their fellows and restrain them from offending outsiders since they are scared of communal war against other ethnic groups. The threat of conflict thus helps to develop an informal in-group policing regime in the target group that may contribute to inter-ethnic peaceful order.
Anthropologists have suggested the possibility that this mechanism occurs in some populations. For instance, it was reported that Eskimos around Point Barrow were so influenced by the fear of feud that any culpable behavior that could lead to violence were firmly suppressed: be much cheaper and more effective than monitoring from outside, and in-group monitoring may help to reduce out-group offenses. Co-ethnics are in a better position to monitor themselves than ethnic outsiders.
Second, because of the tight social connectedness in an ethnic group, in-group punishment, also induced by the threat of conflict, can also be cheaper and more effective than an individual punishment from outsiders. Peers can impose various kinds of penalties on those who misbehave. For example, social ostracism by peers or the boycotting of a business can be sufficient to discourage opportunistic transgressions. On the other hand, it is likely to be more difficult and costly for outsiders to effectively restrain individual wrongdoers because of the lack of social connectedness.
For the two reasons above, fellows of the victim may wage communal vendetta against the victimizer's group because "group-level sanctions may be expected to outperform individual-level ones." 18 Since coethnics are in a better position to monitor and control their peers than are outside entities, external avengers take advantage of the insiders' position: the avengers overcome the discrepancy between intraand inter-group network densities by taking hostile actions. Moreover, this physical confrontation by outsiders may further consolidate the in-group policing regime. This in-group policing mechanism of criminal conflict is found in medieval Iceland: "group liability ... rendered the feud or fear of feud much more effective as an instrument of social control than it would otherwise have been if only the actual wrongdoer suffered the consequences of his actions." 19 Because a wrongdoer is a potential danger to his neighbors, he would be purged from his village to evade the escalation of violence. According to the above-quoted report about the Nyakyusa people in Tanzania, "thieves and adulterers were liable to be banished from a village just like witches and sorcerers, for they too brought misfortune on their fellows." 20 This sort of social ostracism may work as a penalty to suppress culpable behavior.
To summarize, out-group peaceful order is enforced by in-group policing, while in-group policing is induced by out-group conflict. Although it cannot be asserted that the third mechanism is always the case, it is richer in supportive incidents than the two others. We have found several examples of this 7 mechanism at work in addition to those already illustrated: Eskimos in Alaska, medieval Icelanders, and the Nyakyusa people in Tanzania. For instance, the famous T.E. Lawrence, more commonly known as
Lawrence of Arabia, reported in his autobiography that, on the way to see the king of Iraq, he met a lonely Arab man who was excluded from the Arab community and lived alone because he had murdered a Christian. 21 We have also located in-group policing mechanisms in Poland and the Ottoman empire which afforded a considerable degree of autonomy to ethnic minorities.
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This in-group policing account for inter-ethnic criminal conflict suggests that the success of inter-ethnic peace hinges critically on each group's quality of in-group policing. As a consequence, groups with higher quality in-group policing can enjoy long-lasting and stable peace, whereas those with lower quality policing tend to suffer more frequent and longer disputes with other groups. In the absence of Leviathan, in-group policing can play a decisive role in maintaining a peaceful order. Without effective in-group policing, conflict might be inevitable.
Collective punishment practiced in a modern society
Applications of the in-group policing regime and collective punishment can be broadly observed even in a modern society where individual rights are highly respected. In a production team, for example, workers' individual performance is often evaluated in the context of the group. The employer relies on the peer pressure this situation generates to ensure productivity. 23 Group lending of microcredit is another instance.
Because debtors are jointly liable, they tend to encourage each other's scheduled repayment. 24 Similarly, editors of scholarly journals may rely in part on coauthors who are in a better position to repress each other's academic misconducts. Two final examples of collective punishment in modern society can be seen in the political and business sphere: it is ruled in Britain and Japan that a councilor shall lose his seat in the Parliament if the councilor's secretary conducts a criminalized act such as bribe; in corporate governance, shareholders are liable for the torts and crimes of their corporation.
Conclusion
Based on a rational choice theory of collective action, we have presented three hypothetical accounts for criminal conflicts: (i) informational; (ii) preferential; and (iii) functional. For all three hypotheses, we argue that the disparity in density between intra-and inter-group networks is the key obstacle undermining inter-group peaceful order. Although we have focused on interactions between ethnic or tribal groups, our theory can apply to other kinds of informal groups or organizations such as gangs.
Similar patterns of conflict can be observed among gangs because they have kinship-like characteristics 8 such as recognizable physical and cultural traits (e.g., colors and hand signs), demarcated geographical zones (i.e., turfs), and norms that dictate preferential treatment to group members.
Hypothesis (i) explains the escalation of communal violence in terms of the identification problem of an inter-ethnic transgressor. Hypothesis (ii) holds that inter-ethnic retaliation is collective because avengers exploit altruistic concerns among kinsmen to discourage inter-group opportunism. Hypothesis (iii) maintains that external confrontation between tribal or ethnic groups is called for to develop internal social control within each group. Although the first two hypotheses cannot be fully rejected, the third is most closely associated with reported incidents.
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